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This thesis integrates Concurrent Engineering (CE) or Design for Manufacturability into 
a government research and development agency. For new weapon concepts originating 
within government, CE is difficult to apply effectively within the policies and 
bureaucratic structures. This project describes a proposed structure for a development 
agency, using fuzes and the U.S. Army Fuze Division as a basis.  
Although the Fuze Division’s application of CE to date has been effective, much 
potential remains unreachable due to the Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition 
policy, with its series of incremental design phases.  
The proposed organization is arranged in teams according to professional/ 
engineering specialty. In addition, manufacturing engineering and fuze systems 
engineering groups are introduced. Integrated Product Teams managed by a member of 
the systems engineering group would draw from each of the specialized groups. 
This project illustrates that an agency can be organized to support and promote 
effective concurrent engineering within the limitations of the DOD acquisition policy. 
With this structure, manufacturing considerations will be deliberately integrated into 
every new fuze design, at all design phases. Although current policy may not allow 
skipping a phase, the “Milestone B” fuze will now be functionally operational and 
manufacturable, greatly reducing the design work remaining for Milestone C. 
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Currently, the development of a new specialized ammunition technology item such as a 
fuze takes too long, from initial concept through final production design, which is 
approved for fielding. As a rough order of magnitude, development of a “technology 
demonstration” (tech demo) fuze may require about five years from beginning until 
completion of sufficient testing to demonstrate that the new fuze is nominally capable of 
meeting performance requirements. At this point, after successful demonstration testing, 
the fuze design is approved to begin full-scale development—also known as “System 
Design and Development” (SDD). It is not uncommon for this SDD phase to require as 
much time as for the tech demo phase, or another five years. The reason for this simply 
stated is that although the fuze performance was successfully demonstrated, in order to be 
manufactured at high rates, much of the fuze’s configuration must be significantly 
reworked to accommodate fabrication, assembly and manufacturing methods appropriate 
for production rates. Essentially, the entire fuze will be redesigned from the ground up 
during the SDD phase. 
 In order to facilitate a more efficient and effective design process, an 
organizational structure based on the matrix approach is recommended within the Fuze 
Division. This provides an environment to build effective product teams, while keeping 
functional groups together to establish and maintain several essential core competencies 
specific to fuzing technology. 
The objective of this thesis is to propose an organizational structure through 
which a government design and development center can build and maintain the capability 
to perform concurrent engineering and integrate manufacturing and production 
engineering into the configuration of weapon systems, with fuzes selected as the 
example. Key challenges include developing a viable core competency in the area of 
manufacturing engineering, within an organization that does not actually manufacture 
any products. Also of interest is the requirement to conduct all fuze development 
according to and within the framework of the currently prevailing Joint Capabilities 
Integration and Development System (JCIDS) acquisition policy. The present structure 
 xiv
places an inherent emphasis on system performance requirements during the early phases 
of development, specifically during the Technology Development phase between 
Milestones A and B and also during the Engineering Manufacturing and Development 
period between Milestones B and C. During these phases, design reviews are arranged to 
require performance demonstrations in order to get approval (and funding) to proceed to 
the next phase of development. While prudent and necessary to protect the resources and 
financial interest of the Department of Defense and ultimately the taxpayer, 
manufacturing considerations are given minimal attention or simply “left out” when the 
main objective is to simply prove that a new design concept is feasible from an 
operational standpoint. It is interesting to note that even though the name of this phase 
actually includes the term “Manufacturing” most of the emphasis in reality is placed on 
engineering for performance and not so much on design for manufacturability. In fact, 
attention to manufacturing generally does not happen until the second half of this phase, 
after most of the work in the Integrated System Design half of the phase has been 
completed. 
Short of completely revising the JCIDS process to specifically include 
manufacturing engineering up front, this effort explores the use of organizational 
structure as a means of building manufacturing engineering into the normal process of 
developing a new product such as a fuze. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
In the early 2000s, the Army’s Research Development & Engineering Command 
(RDECOM) identified the need to develop in-house prototyping capabilities for several 
key technology areas deemed critical to defense systems. As a result, senior management 
allocated budget to initiate the Manufacturing Enterprise effort under which specific 
categories of technology were reviewed.  Fuzes were among the items presented by a 
team including the author, and subsequently identified for which such prototyping 
capabilities were deemed essential. As a result, the Army’s Armament Research 
Development and Engineering Center (ARDEC) established the Fuze Development 
Center (FDC) at Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey, for the purpose of providing a capability 
to design and build prototype fuzes and related components suitable for operational 
testing. As the FDC was in the process of being stood up, an apparent gap in ARDEC’s 
capabilities relative to fuze development began to emerge–specifically the challenge of 
taking a new fuze design and efficiently transforming it from a working prototype to a 
configuration suitable for mass production (Redington 2010). 
ARDEC has a long-established and continues to maintain a talented and proven 
pool of technical expertise for all levels and all types of fuze design. Over the years, the 
ARDEC Fuze Division has originated numerous highly successful fuze design concepts. 
Additionally, within the fuze industrial base, several contractors have proven capabilities 
with regard to full scale engineering and manufacturing development of fuzes.  
The so-called gap is found in the transition from a fuze that works (technology 
demonstration, commonly referred to as “tech demo”) to a fuze that is economical to 
manufacture. With fuze technology becoming increasingly complex, the process to 
develop a new fuze from concept to working prototype requires many years due to factors 
such as long lead times to design and produce a single custom electronic chip. Upon 
successful completion of a tech demo, the fuze design then moves into the system design 
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& development (SDD) phase, which generally requires several more years before the 
fuze can be released for production and fielding to the Warfighter.  
The net result is that the current practice is to begin with a concept development 
phase that focuses all resources and brainpower toward the goal of demonstrating 
performance, meaning that it is possible to build a fuze that is capable of providing the 
specifically-defined desired operational functions. As such, the design, prototype and 
testing segments are all executed with the goal of minimizing time; cost and materials 
necessary to perform the immediate task at hand (e.g., build only a minimal quantity of 
prototype hardware necessary to run a test to verify performance). 
This thesis describes the current fuze development process and some of the 
specific areas related to manufacturing design. It explores in detail how to build a system 
architecture for the fuze development organization to deliberately integrate the 
manufacturing process into the entire design process from the beginning, starting with 
initial concept. 
If successful, the system architecture will drive the design team to deliberately 
design-in features from the ground up that are geared toward manufacturability. The 
result of which would deliver a complete fuze ready for production immediately after the 
first successful design-build-test cycle is complete. Ideally, this would translate into 
merging the tech demo and manufacturing development phases together into one phase 
within a timeframe normally needed for one phase. The potential cost savings would be 
significant in terms of dollars and overall time required for fielding. 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis research is to propose a system architecture that is 
designed with the specific purpose of ensuring that manufacturing process is included and 
accounted for from the very beginning of a fuze development effort. This thesis is 
designed to be widely applicable among many classes of weapon systems. While 
concurrent engineering is a generally accepted practice among the industry leaders in the 
commercial world, it would appear that although the Department of Defense claims to 
support the concept, the organizations are generally configured based on historical 
 3
traditions such as forming groups to handle specific classes or families of weapon 
systems. For example, the ARDEC Fuze Division has generally been divided into a group 
for artillery fuzes, another for mortar fuzes, grenade fuzes and so forth. This approach has 
served well and has resulted in many exceptional fuzes over the years in terms of being 
capable of meeting demanding performance requirements. However, with available fuze 
technologies becoming more complex during recent years, the fuze designs have 
followed the trend and become much more complex as well. As such, development times 
have become longer, while at the same time, continually evolving mission needs have 
given rise to new operational requirements rapidly emerging from multiple combat 
theaters, with the demand to meet these requirements as quickly as possible. 
It is worth noting at this point that the ARDEC Fuze Division also includes 
several groups devoted to advanced research aimed at developing future fuze 
technologies. For the purpose of this study, only the parts of the organization that support 
the development of specific fuzes are being considered in an effort to clearly present an 
organizational structure that is designed for product development.  
Fuzes have been selected as an example of a specialized class of weapon system 
that can be used that cite specific attributes that illustrate the utility of this thesis. A fuze 
is defined according to The U.S. Army Materiel Command’s Engineering Design 
Handbook Ammunition Series Fuzes (November 1969) as: 
A device with explosive components designed to initiate a train of fire or 
detonation in an item of ammunition by an action such as hydrostatic 
pressure, electrical energy, chemical action, impact, mechanical time or a 
combination of these. (G-3)  
The primary function of a fuze is to detect a “valid target” and then reliably 
initiate an explosive train to detonate the ammunition item. The target sensing functions 
available include a range from simple to extremely complex, including basic impact, to 
electronic proximity sensors, to specific target signature recognition devices. 
In addition to the basic function of initiating the detonation of ammunition, 
modern fuzes must perform a safety role to prevent unintentional detonation to minimize 
the hazard to the Warfighter. This is typically accomplished by providing a mechanical 
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separation between sensitive, limited output primary explosive and the secondary, less 
sensitive high explosive components.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 What organizational structure(s) have been used successfully by private 
sector manufacturing firms? 
 For a government design and development organization, how can an 
organizational structure be designed to deliberately promote the 
integration of manufacturing into the product development process? 
 What does the proposed organizational structure look like? How does it 
improve upon the established organizational structure? 
D. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
This thesis provides a suggested organizational structure for a government design 
and development agency that will facilitate the integration of manufacturing and 
production engineering into the complete product development cycle. If implemented and 
properly managed, an organization such as the U.S. Army’s Fuze Division will be able to 
significantly reduce the time required to field a new weapon system such as a fuze. This 
thesis will provide a basis of knowledge that can be used directly by U.S. Army ARDEC, 
and leveraged by other military related activities; in order to establish a system 
architecture for an organization with the mission to more effectively develop precision 
weapon systems, by incorporating the development process along with the manufacturing 
process. 
E. SCOPE  
 The thesis focuses on a system architecture or structure that can be put in place 
and used to guide the development process for any type of fuze to ensure that 
producibility is intentionally designed in up front, rather than added on top of an already-
established design afterwards. This thesis is focused on fuze design, for the benefit of 
using very specific examples and information to illustrate certain points. However, it is 
intended to be of interest and applicable to a range of government design and 
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development agencies, specifically those involved with other specialized classes of 
weapon systems and components. 
 
 A brief description of the concurrent engineering practices currently in effect at 
the FDC is provided as a point of reference. Following said description; successful CE 
approaches from Industry are reviewed to understand what was done from an 
organizational structure standpoint to facilitate the adoption of CE into the normal routine 
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II. FUZE DEVELOPMENT CENTER OVERVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
During the relatively short time that the Fuze Development Center (FDC) has 
been in operation, several new designs for fuzes and fuzing components have been 
designed and produced, with successful results based on the author’s direct involvement.. 
The FDC was conceived to operate in a similar manner as small business, albeit within 
the constraints of being a government-owned and operated organization. (Author 
participated on team that developed this approach.) 
The facility has been fitted with manufacturing and production equipment 
necessary to support all aspects of fuzing. The underlying purpose is to demonstrate that 
a given fuze design can be manufactured with commercial equipment normally available 
to a typical fuze contractor. 
That being said, as the FDC was made available to the fuze engineering 
community, it rapidly became evident based on the direct observation of the author, that 
the practice of design for manufacturability is a concept that design engineers seem 
reluctant to embrace. Although most engineers will readily agree that design for 
manufacturability is valid in principle, the actual practice is quite different. Faced with 
the pressure of producing a new fuze design, usually with less than optimal funding, 
limited availability of technical personnel and time, there is a perception that 
manufacturing engineering is not essential at this time. As such, phrases such as “we just 
need to get this fuze to work right now,” “we can worry about producibility later,” or 
better yet, “leave that to a contractor, since they are the manufacturing experts” are used 
to justify focusing all efforts to designing for mission-related primary performance 
characteristics only, again, based on the author’s experience.  
Additionally, engineers tend to segregate themselves into specialties, such as 
electronic circuit design, or mechanical design. In the world of fuze design, these are 
further divided into highly specialized areas of expertise such as proximity sensor design, 
Global Positioning System (GPS) sensors, Micro Electro-Mechanical Systems (MEMS) 
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and so forth. Many consider “manufacturing engineering” to be a separate specialty to be 
performed by another engineer, and usually at a later time, because there is no sense in 
wasting valuable engineering time to streamline the design of a component that may not 
meet performance requirements and then needs to be redesigned or even abandoned 
based on the author’s experience and multiple conversations with colleagues. .  
Because manufacturability of a military product such as a fuze is not regarded as a 
performance requirement, it is subconsciously or even deliberately given a lower priority 
than other classical performance requirements considered to be common knowledge 
among the fuze community, such as explosive train reliability, radio frequency (RF) 
signal strength, proximity sensor target recognition, impact survivability, material 
strength and so forth. At this early point in the design process, manufacturing is largely 
regarded as a distraction that serves no immediate use, but only interferes with the 
priority of making the fuze work. 
This is unfortunate, because beyond the traditionally recognized high-cost 
tradeoff items like molded vs. machined parts, there are numerous more subtle 
opportunities for a design to facilitate production with little or zero cost added. One such 
example of a zero-cost design feature is including a set of reference markings (known in 
the trade as “fiducials”) on a printed circuit board (Stephen Redington, personal 
communication). A fiducial is an index mark (typically a solid circle), made of the same 
copper material as the conductive tracks on the circuit board, which is used by the optical 
sensors on automated surface-mount assembly equipment to index and set the location of 
all the electronic components. The addition of fiducials to the artwork of a circuit board 
literally costs nothing to include, but without them, automated equipment cannot be used 
for assembly without requiring either a revision to the board design or additional 
programming time to search for features on the circuit board that might be sufficiently 
recognizable by the optics to establish suitable reference (Stephen Redington, personal 
communication). For hand-assembled experimental circuits, there is no need for such 
markings, so a design engineer has no reason to even think about including them on 
his/her design, which means that even if the experimental circuit performs perfectly, a 
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design revision will still be necessary, if only to add two “spots” per circuit card to allow 
for automated assembly.  
In the past, the practice of deferring manufacturing engineering to later did not 
seem to affect the ultimate success of a fuze development program. However, fuzes were 
mainly mechanical devices, with limited electronics on board, and the transition from 
prototype to production was fairly well understood. Modern fuzes are complex electro-
mechanical devices designed for missions with demanding performance requirements, 
including proximity function with sophisticated electronic anti-countermeasure features 
built into the RF signal. One of the unpredictable side effects with precision electronics 
that is considered common knowledge among those involved in electronic design, is that 
the performance of a circuit can be affected simply by changing the physical location of 
components. This alone is reason for concern when a proven prototype fuze configuration 
is revised to improve producibility, particularly if physical layout of the circuit must be 
changed to facilitate assembly. 
In addition, the prevailing Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 
(JCIDS) project management process for DoD acquisitions tends to emphasize schedule 
and performance and focus on acquisition cost, during earlier phases of development 
based on the author’s experience and multiple conversations and interactions with 
colleagues. . Again, because manufacturing/producibility engineering tends to add 
significant immediate cost, with no discernible (immediate) benefit, this is unfortunately 
an easy cut for a project manager to make, especially when under threat of program delay 
or cost growth or budget cutbacks. 
B. CURRENT PRACTICES 
Within the FDC, as a new fuze or fuze component design is developed, a spiral 
development process is utilized. The FDC process is similar to and based upon the “spiral 
–to-circle” model used by Industry and described by Maier and Rechtin (2002). Figure 1 
shows a highly simplified map of the process as normally executed in a government 
product development program. The grey oval at the left represents the technology 
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demonstration phase typically performed by the government, with the output being in the 
form of a conceptual design along with a contract to perform final manufacturing design.  
 
Figure 1.  Simplified Government / Industry Design & Development Process  
(from Redington 2010)  
At that point, a contract is developed to manage the transfer of design 
requirements to a defense contractor, who takes the concept and essentially repeats the 
development cycle represented by the triangle in the process map diagram, with the 
development and addition of manufacturing data to be incorporated into the final product 
design. It is noted that the primary output and objective of the current practice is focused 
on the end item hardware, or the design of the fuze itself, with a result that many of the 
manufacturing process details remain within the contractor as proprietary or trade secrets. 
Figure 2 shows the format of the design process as adapted and currently in use 
by the FDC (Redington 2010). For fuzes and fuzing components developed within the 
FDC, the normal process has been streamlined by essentially merging the two cycles into 
a single cycle that incorporates manufacturing processes into the development process. A 
notable difference is that the primary output of this FDC development process is the 
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manufacturing data, instead of the design of only the fuze hardware, as shown in the 
traditional approach.  
 
Figure 2.  Design & Development Process Used by ARDEC Fuze  
Development Center (from Redington 2010) 
This set of manufacturing data will include the usual technical data such as 
drawings and specifications, along with comprehensive descriptions of all manufacturing 
processes that were developed concurrently with the fuze. This complete set of 
information can then be transferred to any capable fuze contractor, with a high 
probability of success in production of the new fuze. A corollary benefit is that the new 
fuze design now comes with a documented and demonstrated manufacturing process, 
which makes it difficult to defend a claim that the new fuze design cannot be produced. 
This process is modeled after current product development practices used by 
industry. To date, the FDC has used this process quite effectively to manage the design of 
fuze components such as electronic circuit assemblies. A more detailed process specific 
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to managing the development of circuit card assemblies used by the FDC is shown in 
Figure 3. It is noted that since its inception, the FDC has not yet been given the 
opportunity to become involved in any complete “start-to-finish” new fuze development 
programs which are few and far between. 
 
Figure 3.  ARDEC Fuze Development Center Detailed Process  
(from Redington unpublished) 
Beyond the FDC, the larger Fuze Division remains more or less traditionally 
structured in that branches or teams consist of groups of engineers assigned to similar 
fuze types based on end item (e.g., artillery, mortars, grenades). 
C. BENEFITS 
The benefits to the FDC’s current practice have been realized to some degree 
already. For some projects, the turnaround time has been radically improved. One 
example of a success story is that of a small supplemental circuit that was designed by 
another agency for use as a performance upgrade to an existing, currently fielded tactical 
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missile system. The design was presented to the FDC, and FDC engineering staff 
reviewed the design, recommended and made a few minor modifications and completed 
the design. At the initial meeting, a circuit design was presented that included all 
components laid out on a square printed wiring board (PWB).  During the discussion, 
drawings for another design on a circular PWB were noticed.  Upon further inquiry, it 
was explained that the square design was intended to verify circuit performance, and the 
circular design was the same circuit, configured to fit into the available space inside the 
missile.  The FDC engineering team immediately recommended starting with the round 
design, on the assumption that if it functioned properly, that would completely eliminate 
a second iteration.  So the decision was made to produce the prototype circuit to 
production specifications. 
Then a sample production quantity was run, basic testing of this circuit assembly 
was performed (successfully) and the working components were delivered to the (Army) 
customer all within two weeks from the date of the initial meeting, for which the simple 
decision to begin with the final design configuration easily eliminated at least two weeks 
from the overall turnaround time  (Stephen Redington, personal communication). 
However, this current practice of bringing a more or less completed design to the 
FDC has also brought to light some of the problems and inefficiencies that are due to the 
“old way” of conducting business. Even though it can be painful at the time, the 
discovery of bad news can be beneficial, because the issues can only be addressed once 
they have been made known. 
One such issue is the understanding that the FDC resources can add the most 
value when engaged early in the design process. A common scenario involves a group of 
engineers showing up at the FDC with a “box of parts” collection of new and custom 
fabricated parts such as printed circuit boards, and Surface Mount Technology (SMT) 
components with the idea of using the automated assembly equipment to save some time 
and money. However, at this point the design is already established and may actually 
interfere with the ability to effectively and efficiently set up and run the product through 
the automated assembly line. 
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Although much progress has been made since the establishing of production 
prove out capabilities at the Fuze Development Center, there is still no formal strategy to 
define when and how to incorporate the resources such as the FDC into the design 
process, based on the current practice as observed by the author. This thesis is an 
approach to provide an organizational layout that is conducive to effectively integrating 
design for manufacturing into the normal routine for development of new fuzes. 
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III. RESEARCH ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes a review of concurrent engineering design practices, in 
general. More significantly, the current practice within the ARDEC Fuze Division, and in 
particular the Fuze Development Center is described as well. Of particular interest is the 
application of concurrent engineering practices within the FDC, which has recently begun 
to incorporate some basic design for manufacturing principles into its standard routine. 
B. CONCURRENT ENGINEERING 
In order to develop a useful, approach to effectively incorporate concurrent 
engineering into an organization, it is helpful to understand the concept of CE along with 
how the organization has utilized CE to date.  This section includes a brief overview of 
CE along with a summary of CE as practiced by the FDC.   
1. Review of Concurrent Engineering Design Practices  
Throughout Industry, the practice of concurrent engineering is widespread and 
generally accepted as a “best practice” among successful commercial entities engaged in 
the design and development of technologically complex products intended to be produced 
and sold to customers.  
Although many definitions can be found, the practice of Concurrent Engineering 
(CE) is essentially defined as “a systematic approach to creating a product design that 
simultaneously considers all elements of the product life cycle, from conception through 
disposal, to include consideration lf manufacturing processes, transportation process, 
maintenance process, and so on.” (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2006). Instead of simply 
designing first to meet basic operational performance requirements, the practice of CE 
requires that later phases of the life cycle, such as production, maintenance and end of 
service life disposal, must be taken into account up front.  
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Concurrent engineering, described by Anderson “is the proactive practice of 
designing products in multifunctional teams with all specialties working together from 
the earliest stages” (Anderson 2010). 
According to Ranky: 
Concurrent Engineering is very much a team management, people, 
communications, sound technology and a “culture” issue. It is about 
thinking of the “total design and manufacturing cycle” and implementing 
it using appropriate (not necessarily the latest) technologies and excellent 
people equipped with multidisciplinary skills… The heart of the problem 
is that engineers in design, manufacturing, quality assurance and 
maintenance do not speak the same language. Most obstacles are cultural 
and organizational. (1994)  
And in 1987, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 
generated a definition as well: 
Concurrent Engineering is a systematic approach to the integrated 
concurrent design of products and their related processes including 
manufacturing and support. This approach is intended to cause the 
developers from the outset to consider all elements of the product life-
cycle from conception through disposal including quality, cost, schedule 
and other user requirements. (Backhouse 1996)  
Although $60 million was spent, Backhouse observes that the DARPA effort 
failed to explain the need for CE (Backhouse 1996). It is reasonable to suggest that the 
same economic forces behind the trend of private firms drive toward CE represent a valid 
need for CE within the government community. However, economic viability being an 
essential element to the survival of private firms, it is not surprising to find that the 
pursuit of CE has been given high priority among the private sector. Unfortunately, 
among the government community, CE may only be pursued as long as it remains a 
management focus area, with little immediate negative consequence for failing to fully 
incorporate CE into the normal routine and accept CE into the prevailing culture. 
CE provides an effective means of pursuing design simplicity. Huthwaite cites 
Henry Ford’s quote as follows: “My constant effort is in the direction of simplicity. 
Complexity is the enemy. Nearly everything we make is much more complex than it 
needs to be” (2007). 
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A significant part of CE is the concept of Design for Manufacturability (DFM), 
which is described by Chiang and Kawa, as follows: 
Design for manufacturability (DFM) in its broad definition stands for the 
methodology of ensuring that a product can be manufactured repeatedly, 
consistently, reliably, and cost effectively by taking all the measures 
needed for that goal starting at the concept stage of a design and 
implementing these measures throughout the design, manufacturing, and 
assembly processes. It is a solid awareness that a product’s quality and 
yield start at the design stage and are not simply a manufacturing 
responsibility. (2007) 
DFM is also defined in more detail by Anderson as  “the process of proactively 
designing products to: (a) optimize all the manufacturing functions: fabrication, 
assembly, test, procurement, shipping, service, and repair; (b) assure the best cost, 
quality, reliability, regulatory compliance, safety, time-to-market, and customer 
satisfaction; and (c) ensure that lack of manufacturability does not compromise 
functionality, styling, new product introductions, product delivery, improvement 
programs, strategic initiatives, and unexpected surges in product demand” (Anderson 
2010). 
Economics is the primary motive behind the widespread acceptance of CE among 
the commercial world. In short, CE works. It allows for a much shorter design cycle, with 
products such as cell phones and smart devices moving from concept to production-ready 
in three to six months. Many firms, driven by economical need have embraced CE as a 
matter of survival, but in doing so have greatly improved their products but also the 
capability of their organizations to rapidly and reliably develop new products. 
A multi-functional or cross-functional team approach to design is the key element 
of successful CE implementation. As per analysis presented by Ng and Jee, of a 
Malaysian semiconductor manufacturing firm,  
…it is apparent that the firm’s product development team consist of cross-
functional engineering teams that work together in order to achieve better 
performance in their projects. Due to the cross-functional nature of these 
teams, employees from different departments require to have regular 
progress review meetings so that all functions involved can gather together 
and contribute their ideas or concerns on the project. (Ng and Jee 2013) 
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Perhaps even more important is the idea of early active participation by all 
members of the multi-functional teams. Ranky states “Every important design decision 
must be considered with great care at the earliest stage by a team of: Designers; 
manufacturing engineers, marketing experts, quality and maintenance engineers as well 
as the key customers” (Ranky 1994).  
Beyond the composition of the team itself, the concept of teamwork is essential. 
Prasad states “Teamwork cross-pollinates teams’ ideas and gives members of a work-
group a better understanding of their approach and methods of common problem solving 
on the whole project” (Prasad 1996). 
2. Review of Concurrent Engineering Practices at ARDEC Fuze 
Development Center  
From the start, FDC engineers have incorporated concurrent engineering 
principles into their design process to the greatest extent practical. This has worked fairly 
well for projects on which the FDC has been given control of the development process, 
and particularly where the FDC has been involved very early in the design process. 
Difficulties tend to arise in a typical situation where the FDC is requested to develop an 
assembly process for an electronic assembly, using circuit boards that have already been 
fabricated. This is the sort of situation that occurs when design engineers do not fully 
understand the concept of concurrent engineering. For example, a design engineer (or 
group) acting in good faith, comes up with a circuit design, and then extensive bench 
testing is performed and completed to prove it works. Then, in an effort to keep the 
process moving forward, the engineer(s) decides to take the next step of designing circuit 
boards and then getting them made. Now, with all the components in hand, the design 
team decides to take advantage of the automated assembly capability at the FDC, and 
asks for their help.  
At this point the FDC team is forced to work with the components provided, 
which greatly limits the flexibility in optimizing an assembly process. For the example of 
an electronic assembly, there are many factors to consider when selecting components for 
automated assembly.  
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Besides the physical configuration of the parts, many components are available 
pre-packaged for automated assembly (on reels for high quantities or sticks for smaller 
quantities). Furthermore, many components such as connectors may be completely 
eliminated by changing the configuration of the circuit board itself. The use of a rigid-
flex type of circuit board typically results in a significant reduction or the complete 
elimination of interconnects between boards, with the added benefit of greatly improving 
performance (reliability) by removing a usual source of failure, and also cost savings by 
reducing parts count and optimizing the required assembly time.  
C. RESEARCH 
Research for this thesis was conducted, which consisted of a literature review in 
search of any work that may have been done to address the role of concurrent engineering 
relative to government product development projects.  
1. Literature Review 
A literature search was performed, but no significant information was found 
specifically relating the incorporating of concurrent engineering into practice within the 
framework of a government-owned research and development enterprise. As such, this 
thesis will describe a proposed structure to facilitate and encourage the integration of 
concurrent engineering into the DNA of an organization’s operational structure. 
However, looking beyond the realm of government agencies, many private-sector firms 
have experienced success with adopting concurrent engineering. In many cases, effective 
implementation of CE necessitated the evaluation and re-working of management and 
organizational structures. Some key examples of organizational structuring to 
accommodate CE are discussed below. 
A key factor or possibly the key factor in successful implementation of CE is the 
establishment of effective teams, and then providing an environment conducive to 
teamwork. Ranky describes teamwork as follows: “…designers, manufacturing 
engineers, marketing personnel, quality and maintenance engineers and the customers 
work together to achieve joint success. …we need more freedom, more openness, better 
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overall communication and understanding between all those involved in developing the 
product” (Ranky 1994).  
According to Anderson, early forming of “complete teams” is essential for 
success. It is beneficial to include vendors on design teams to allow them to participate in 
the design of components and parts that they will end up building. Also, Anderson 
indicates it is useful to include “non-technical” team members such as marketing  
(to represent the voice of the Customer) as well as purchasing personnel to work with 
vendors to establish partnership relationships and also to pre-qualify parts (Anderson 
2010). 
The apparent industry standard has most successful firms utilizing some form of 
matrix management structure to coordinate project teams made up of personnel from 
multiple disciplines (Backhouse 1996). Backhouse identifies four variants of 
management structures ranging from functional to dedicated project teams. Diagrams for 
each are shown in Figure 4. In addition to the basic “functional” organization, the other 
three are forms of matrix structures, with varying levels of emphasis on the project or 
product teams. Backhouse notes that CE has been a significant influence in driving 
companies from traditional functional structures, toward a matrix-based approach. 
Backhouse observes a learning-curve effect among firms that have re-organized along 
project-based teams as follows: 
However, experience has shown that companies which have moved 
directly from a functional organization to a project-based structure have, 
over time, actively moved to reintroduce some of the elements of 
functional structure. Frequently the requirement for this is to ensure long-
term retention of skilled people through the provision of an identifiable 
location within their peer group. The undoubted benefits of pure project-
based structures bring with them certain long-term deficiencies which can 
only be eliminated by some form of management matrix which includes a 
functional element. (Backhouse 1996) 
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Figure 4.  The Four Basic Structures for Management (from Backhouse 1996) 
As reported by Ranky, “Rolls Royce Motor Limited has incorporated a transition 
from traditional or sequential engineering design and manufacturing to parallel, or 
concurrent and customer driven product creation.” Ranky goes on to state: “Driven by 
completion and cost, Rolls Royce conducted a complete re-evaluation of all activities 
associate with design, manufacture and support of its automobiles. Although known for 
high quality and limited production volumes, the same reasons for developing and 
applying CE included: 
Shortened lead times; 
Increased productivity; 
Products that are: 
 Very high quality; 
 Reliable; 
 Less expensive; 
 Reflect customers’ requirements in a very competitive world market” 
(Ranky 1994).  
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D. PROPOSED FUZE DIVISION MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE 
This section describes the recommended organizational structure for the Fuze 
Division, to form a framework that facilitates effective use of CE principles.    
1. Defining an Effective Fuze Development Organizational Structure  
First, before attempting to lay out an organizational structure, it is important to 
understand and be able to state the purpose of the organization. Functional analysis and 
allocation are described as a method to develop a functional block diagram (Blanchard 
and Fabrycky 1998). A functional decomposition can be used to illustrate all of the 
functions necessary for an organization to be sufficiently capable to accomplish its given 
mission. 
As shown in Figure 5 the first level includes general functions such as: provide 
supervisory management and provide engineering expertise in several of the broad 
disciplines (e.g., mechanical and electrical engineering). Also, at the first level are fuze 
prototyping and production demo, along with fuze systems engineering. At this point, as 





Figure 5.  Fuze Development Organization Functional Decomposition Structure 
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The supervisory management function, although essential, is fairly conventional 
and well understood and will not be discussed in detail for the purpose of this study. 
Also, the mechanical and electronics engineering functions are accepted and well-
defined, so minimal detail will be explored, other than the approach to group engineers 
(in their “supervisory management” teams) according to their specialty rather than by 
fuze/product line, as per current practice. 
Based on a review of case studies of firms that have successfully embraced 
concurrent engineering, most have organized based on the matrix approach. The key 
factors driving success in the private sector (such as permanent groups of like expertise 
from which to draw members for project teams) are applicable for use in a government 
design agency such as the Fuze Division. The (temporary) project-based team approach 
will provide an environment that will foster the teamwork necessary for effective CE, 
while the (permanent) functional portion of the structure will allow the Fuze Division to 
continue to grow and maintain a high level of expertise for all the necessary engineering 
disciplines. 
a. Manufacturing Engineering 
The field of manufacturing engineering is of particular interest for this study, 
because heretofore this field of engineering has not been included within the government 
organization known as the Fuze Division (or within other groups in government agencies 
with the mission of developing specialized classes of weapons systems). Although well-
established among Industry (both commercial and defense) the field of manufacturing 
engineering has had minimal or no representation within the government side of fuze 
development. Reflecting the established “best practices” of Industry, manufacturing 
engineering will now be deliberately included as a primary function of the proposed fuze 
development organization in order to identify it as a unique and essential element of good 
fuze design. 
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b. Fuze Systems Engineering 
The field of systems engineering (SE) is also included as a primary function of the 
organization for the key role of SE to coordinate engineering from each of the core 
specialties and bring them together for specific fuze product design efforts. This new 
Fuze Division organizational structure would include two separate and distinct 
“management” functions, represented by sections 1.0 and 6.0 as shown on the functional 
decomposition diagram. As noted above, the supervisory (1.0) function will be focused 
on personnel management, and maintaining and developing the core competency for each 
engineering specialty. In addition to classical supervisory tasks, the leaders of this group 
would ensure that, for example, the mechanical engineering branch has the latest in 
Computer-Aided Design (CAD) equipment, training and top expertise. For Electronics 
engineering, ensure appropriate participation in latest RF signal processing research 
activities, current state of the art electronic components, etc. The systems engineering 
function (6.0) includes the other management function necessary in a development 
organization, specifically that of project technical management. 
2. Existing Fuze Division Organization Structure 
The existing Fuze Division is currently structured to group personnel by general 
weapon system classes to support fuzing requirements based on the type of weapon. The 
rationale behind this approach is largely based on historical tradition and probably the 
fact that support funding is easier to manage at the fuze level, since funding is typically 
allocated by weapon system and then distributed among all support organizations, fuzing 
being one. A notional (and intentionally simplified) organizational structure representing 
the present approach currently in place for the ARDEC Fuze Division is illustrated in 
Figure 6.  
Although manufacturing engineers could be simply added to each of the teams, 
this would be minimally effective for a government organization that does not inherently 
possess a manufacturing capability. Establishing a distinct manufacturing engineering 
team is essential to cultivate a viable core competency that is both effective and accepted 
by the other design professionals. Additionally, given the fact that this group would be 
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operating at a disadvantage when compared to private companies, because of the lack of 
actual manufacturing performed directly by the government, the new manufacturing 
engineering group must devote an ongoing effort to build and maintain the expertise of its 
members. This would be accomplished by a combination of formal training along with 
periodic on-site visits to manufacturing facilities of firms that provide components for 
Defense products such as fuzes. 
Intentionally sending Fuze Division’s manufacturing engineers out to component 
producers would help to understand how design decisions could affect manufacturing 
cost. As presented by Backhouse, the Rolls-Royce Aerospace Group conducted an effort 
to capture the expertise of component suppliers, and integrate this expertise into their 
product development routine. To ensure success, much effort was taken to evaluate their 
(Rolls-Royce’s) future requirements, and then identify the best suppliers to build a 
corporate database of trusted suppliers. From this database, manufacturing experts from 
the suppliers would be invited to participate in the design process, early enough to 
contribute significant influence to the design for manufacturing efficiency (after 
Backhouse 1996).  
This confirms Huthwaite’s recommendation that management should utilize 
“show us” statements such as: “show us how you are involving manufacturing and 
suppliers ‘up front’ to avoid production problems later. How are you minimizing new 
tooling and capital equipment?” (Huthwaite 2007). 
It would certainly be feasible to cultivate similar relationships between the 
manufacturing engineering group (Fuze Division) and various vendors and manufacturers 




Figure 6.  Present ARDEC Fuze Division Organization Structure (Notional) 
3. Main Themes–Management and Organization Overview 
The management of the Fuze Division would be divided into two main functional 
roles, supervisory management and project management, which are included as the first 
two organizational themes, as follows: 
a. Supervisory Management 
Teams of people would be grouped by field/expertise specialty, forming 
essentially “permanent” teams, with managers responsible for traditional supervisory 
roles. Each worker/employee would be a member of only one permanent team, and 
would remain so regardless of involvement in one or more particular fuze programs. 
b. Project Management 
Teams of people (drawn from the above-noted permanent teams) would be 
formed into IPT’s to support a specific fuze item. This is a systems engineering approach 
in that the cross-functional team will work together to develop the product design, 
coordinating specific elements with the integration of overall customer requirements 
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considered throughout the process. Each IPT will include personnel with expertise 
appropriate to support the design of a particular fuze throughout the development 
process. IPT’s are “temporary” in nature, to remain in existence only as necessary to 
support the design of a new (or upgraded) fuze or fuze component. Upon completion of 
the design, it is likely that the design IPT may be replaced with or transformed into a 
production engineering IPT. Many times, it is valuable to retain expertise specific 
personnel with direct development experience on a particular fuze as it moves into 
production. 
c. Manufacturing Engineering 
A new manufacturing engineering team would be introduced as a new core 
competency as a necessary element within the fuze development agency (Fuze 
Division/FDC). 
The Fuze Division currently maintains strong core competencies in various design 
engineering fields necessary for fuze development (such as electronic and mechanical 
engineering), and highly specialized niche expertise within those fields, such as digital 
signal processing, proximity sensor design, micro-electromechanical systems (MEMS), 
antenna design, etc. However, it is necessary and beneficial to establish and maintain an 
expertise base in the manufacturing engineering field, with appropriate specialties such as 
manufacturing processes, like injection molding, sheet metal forming, and automated 
circuit assembly methods, and perhaps more significantly, concurrent engineering, or the 
specific consideration of manufacturing processes during the product design process.  
d. Design Review Teams 
In addition to the two management functions noted above, design review teams 
will perform a needed part of the development process. 
1. Peer review within Fuze Division–the Design Review Teams (DRT) will 
provide an informal and independent review of fuze projects currently under 
development.  
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2. DRTs will review the IPT structure and membership to ensure that IPT makeup 
is appropriate and sufficient for the type of fuze being developed. 
3. DRTs will review the product (fuze) design details, with attention to functional 
as well as design for production. These design reviews should be planned to occur prior 
to each of the required formal design reviews such as PDRs, CDRs and Fuze Safety 
Board reviews. The informal reviews will serve several purposes beyond the basic 
function of preparing the design (and IPT) for the upcoming formal review. Such “bonus” 
functions include improving the technical competence of the IPT and also that of the 
review team, both of which will serve to improve and broaden the overall core 
competency of the Fuze Division as a whole. 
e. Manufacturing Engineering as a Performance Requirement 
In addition to the establishment of a new team, manufacturing engineering (or 
Concurrent Engineering) will be introduced as a performance requirement for fuzes, with 
equal value or weight as the more traditional “mission” performance requirements and 
objectives. 
4. Proposed Fuze Division Organization Structure 
The Proposed Fuze Division organizational structure is laid out to follow and 
support the functional decomposition discussed earlier. As shown in Figure 7, the 
division chief is responsible for the entire organization, with branch chiefs each 
responsible for teams of engineers, grouped according to engineering discipline and their 
area of specialized expertise. The relationship between the branch chiefs and the division 
chief is fairly common in terms of fulfilling necessary supervisory functions. 
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Figure 7.  Proposed ARDEC Fuze Division Organization Structure 
At this point, it is noted that both the existing and proposed organizational 
structures presented here in terms of structure and exact fields of expertise have been 
simplified and also generalized for the purpose of this study and do not necessarily reflect 
actual conditions or capabilities of the ARDEC Fuze Division. It is further noted that the 
ARDEC Fuze Division also includes several additional groups that are engaged in 
advanced research and development for future fuzing technology, which are not 
discussed here, or included in the proposed organizational structure, to avoid detracting 
from the focus of this effort on manufacturing engineering. 
Within each branch, it is expected that the branch chief would ensure 
development of his/her particular group, to continually grow the core competency within 
that particular specialty. Within a branch, each person would typically be assigned to 
serve on one or more Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) for a particular fuze/product 
development, with the added benefit of collaboration with other “like-minded” engineers 
within the group (branch) as needed. 
The Fuze Division would include two groups performing separate but related 
management functions. First, as noted before, would be the supervisor group, which 
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would include all branch chiefs. The second would be the systems engineering group, 
which would provide a project management role or more specifically, a project technical 
management role, and from this group would be provided IPT leaders for specific fuze 
programs. Individual SEs would be under a SE branch chief. Individual SEs would be 
responsible to lead IPTs formed in a matrix manner where needed engineers would be 
drawn from their various specialty groups. A benefit of grouping all the SE IPT leaders in 
one team is that changing needs of each IPT could be met by IPT leaders regular 
interaction among each other. Also, all the SE IPT leaders would benefit from real-time 
immediate sharing of ongoing IPT activities and lessons learned. 
In addition to IPTs for specific fuze programs, another function to be served 
though cross-functional teaming would be that of peer design review. A secondary role 
for the branch chiefs would be to form a design review team, for the purpose of providing 
periodic, independent review and feedback for all fuze development programs. This 
would serve as a preliminary checkpoint, to help prepare for required reviews by 
established safety boards, such as the Army Fuze Safety Review Board. Also, the design 
review team would ensure that all necessary branches are represented on each of the fuze 
IPTs. 
a. Engineering Branches 
Mechanical and Electronic engineering branches would include sub-groups as 
needed to fulfill specific needs for highly specialized expertise (such as MEMS, 
proximity sensor design, etc.). 
The Manufacturing Engineering branch would be a new addition to the Fuze 
Division. As noted earlier, the field of manufacturing engineering has found little to no 
representation in the phases of fuze development normally performed by government 
agencies. As a new group, the manufacturing engineering branch chief would be 
responsible to build a core of manufacturing engineers, with a specific focus on fuzing. 
The manufacturing engineering branch would include mechanical and electronic 
engineers who understand mechanical and electronic assembly equipment and processes. 
It is expected that some percentage of overhead type time would include extensive 
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interaction with Industry, since the government does not directly own much in the way of 
manufacturing capability other than ammunition loading plants. It is significant to note 
that there is currently no manufacturing engineering expertise, particularly at the 
management level. As such, a key recommendation would be to seek out and hire an 
individual with a strong background in manufacturing to serve as the branch chief for the 
(proposed) manufacturing engineering branch. In addition to being responsible for 
establishing and maintaining the core competency, this individual would hold 
responsibility during gate reviews to ensure manufacturability of each fuze product. 
A diagram showing the interaction of a new Manufacturing Engineering branch is 
shown in Figure 8. In order to be successful, this manufacturing engineering group must 
include intentional interaction with a variety of firms involved in manufacturing of fuzes, 
fuzing components and related products. 
 
Figure 8.  Proposed Manufacturing Engineering Branch Role 
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At this point it should be noted that due to the limitations imposed by “approved” 
government job descriptions (engineering series, grade, etc.) and established personnel 
allocations, it may not be practical to hire manufacturing engineers. Instead, the likely 
approach to fill these positions would be to find mechanical, electronics and industrial 
engineers with an interest in manufacturing and engage in a deliberate effort to develop 
these people into manufacturing engineers. In order to develop a capable core 
competency in fuze manufacturing engineering, it will be necessary to develop 
specialized expertise in the following areas essential to fuzing: 
Injection molding/casting 
Metal forming and stamping 
Automated assembly (electronic circuits and mechanical components) 
Specialized assembly applicable to fuzing (MEMS, safe and arm assembly) 
Anderson describes Honda’s approach to provide in-depth introduction of new 
engineers to their manufacturing process as follows: 
At Honda, all entry-level engineers spend their first three months in the 
company working on the assembly line. They’re then rotated to the 
marketing department for the next three months. They spend the next year 
rotating through the engineering departments–drive train, body, chassis, 
and process machinery. Finally, after they have been exposed to the entire 
range of activities involved in designing and making a car, they are ready 
for an assignment to an engineering specialty, perhaps in the engine 
department. (Anderson 2010) 
In contrast, entry-level engineers typically begin their careers in government with 
an extensive series of training classes, with emphasis on learning procedures such as 
dimensioning and tolerances standards for government drawings, along with some 
limited hands-on exposure to the handling and operation of weapon systems. However, 
there is little to no formal approach to familiarize new engineers with manufacturing 
processes used to produce the weapon systems they will be designing. This is largely due 
to the fact that almost all weapon systems and components are manufactured by defense 
contractors and the (unfortunate) perception that it is best to leave all manufacturability 
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issues to those firms, and allow the government engineers to simply focus on design 
activities. 
b. Design for Production–Anew “Performance Requirement” 
Within the Fuze Division, the “permanent” structure includes branch chiefs. In 
addition to their supervisory roles, a Fuze Design Review Board (FDRB) would be 
established to provide a framework from which to conduct periodic reviews of all 
ongoing design activities within the Fuze Division. The primary function of the FDRB, 
which consists of all the branch chiefs, will be to provide structured, regularly-scheduled 
“gate reviews” for all design/development work being conducted by project-specific 
IPTs. These reviews will initially establish design requirements, and then provide 
periodic feedback to IPTs to ensure all engineering specialties are represented, and being 
applied appropriately. Given that the primary purpose of the proposed new organizational 
structure is to assure the manufacturability of new fuze designs, the gate reviews should 
focus on manufacturability. In order to do this, the review team must include 
manufacturing expertise and currently none of the branch chiefs have this expertise. 
Therefore, the new manufacturing engineering branch chief will have the role of leading 
the manufacturability element of each gate review. 
Also, the FDRB members will also interact with project management offices to 
develop complete and appropriate design criteria for new fuze programs as they emerge. 
Criteria would include normal fuze mission requirements (such as launch environments, 
tactical operational requirements, etc.). In addition, a key goal of the FDRB will be to 
promote the value of good manufacturing engineering and advocate early insertion of 
manufacturing engineering requirements directly into preliminary design criteria. As 
such, the new manufacturing engineering branch chief would be expected to interact with 
the executive organizations responsible for developing design criteria for new programs.  
The currently prevailing JCIDS policy has been developed by the Department of 
Defense with the objective of streamlining the overall development process for complex 
weapon systems. In doing so, the focus on zeroing in on a final design configuration as 
soon as possible actually tends to eliminate design flexibility too early, which inhibits the 
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effective use of CE practices. Because of the focus on operational performance in early 
stages, the eventual manufacturing processes to be used in production are essentially 
ignored. Once a design concept is successfully demonstrated, a milestone decision is then 
made for approval to begin the next phase of design, and is typically accompanied by 
some degree of a design freeze, at least with regard to basic functional configuration. 
This is usually the first opportunity to evaluate appropriate manufacturing processes, 
which is typically part of some sort of “producibility study” in which the design is 
allowed to be “tweaked” but not significantly altered at the risk of invalidating any of the 
preceding functional testing. This inherent weakness in the JCIDS system can essentially 
render most high-payoff manufacturability-driven design improvements “off limits” if 
significant design configuration changes are needed. 
Regardless, the JCIDS process is accepted, well-established and is unlikely to be 
changed very soon. However, within a developmental agency such as the Fuze Division it 
is certainly possible to consider establishing a manufacturing engineering review board to 
serve as an independent design review to force (or, more preferably, encourage in a 
positive manner) the design IPTs to intentionally think about manufacturing processes 
early enough to drive the design. Such a board would help move toward the goal of 
actually designing a new item from the ground-up for production rather than adapting 
(force-fitting) an existing design concept into a producible product later. 
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IV. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
The principle of “design for manufacturing” is proven and generally accepted 
throughout industry. Most manufacturing businesses are fully committed to the approach 
and have streamlined their product development processes to leverage the initial 
investment into substantial value derived from successful and highly producible designs 
being available to the market quicker. Within the domain of government defense 
development agencies including the U.S. Army ARDEC Fuze Division, the normal order 
of operations remains locked into an extensive, serial sequence of discrete incremental 
steps. Although the established policy is based on good intentions of controlling 
expenditures on new products yet to be demonstrated, the present system drives every 
new development program to be managed with a “science project” approach in which the 
primary (or only) goal is to demonstrate proper function of the developmental item. At 
the same time, there is a push to determine a “material solution” very early in the overall 
process, while “production prototypes” are not required until well after the design 
concept has been locked in. This builds in a restrictive boundary when the time comes for 
producibility studies and production engineering. At this point production engineering is 
limited to the extent that the chosen “proven” design can be tweaked to improve 
producibility, but it is no longer cost-effective to consider any “unproven” (high-risk) 
alternative designs which might have improved production efficiencies by an order of 
magnitude. 
Although the current defense system development policy is likely to remain 
unaltered, it is still possible to significantly improve the efficiency of the development 
process by deliberately introducing manufacturing engineering into the early stages of the 
design process. For highly specialized items such as fuzes, the structure of the 
responsible organization (ARDEC Fuze Division) can be designed to facilitate the use of 




The research questions identified earlier are addressed as follows: 
 What organizational structure(s) have been used successfully by private 
sector manufacturing firms? 
Many firms have successfully reorganized to enhance their use of CE practices. 
Most have used some variation of matrix management structures to effectively balance 
their core competencies with the needs of individual design projects. 
 For a government design and development organization, how can an 
organizational structure be designed to deliberately promote the 
integration of manufacturing into the product development process? 
For a government development agency such as the ARDEC Fuze Division, the 
organization can be restructured using many of the principles learned from Industry. 
Utilizing the recognized benefits of the matrix management structure, the grouping of 
core specialties, along with the establishment of a manufacturing engineering group will 
provide a framework from which to develop and maintain an awareness of 
manufacturability among all design activities within the organization. 
 What does the proposed organizational structure look like? How does it 
improve upon the established organizational structure? 
The ARDEC Fuze Division is currently structured to support fuzes according to 
functional groupings of the end item (e.g., mortar fuzes, artillery fuzes). A more effective 
approach to improve the overall quality of fuze designs would be to assign technical 
personnel to home groups according to their specific engineering discipline (e.g., 
electronic engineers in one group, mechanical engineers in another). These home groups 
would fulfill personnel management and supervisory requirements and would also foster 
professional development by keeping similarly skilled people together. 
C. KEY POINTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The ARDEC Fuze Division is currently structured to support fuzes according to 
functional groupings of the end item (e.g., mortar fuzes, artillery fuzes). A more effective 
approach to improve the overall quality of fuze designs would be to assign technical 
personnel to home groups according to their specific engineering discipline (e.g., 
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electronic engineers in one group, mechanical engineers in another). These home groups 
would fulfill personnel management and supervisory requirements and would also foster 
professional development by keeping similarly skilled people together. 
Recommend establishing a team of Fuze system engineers, organized as another 
home group as described above, with each system engineer to be assigned a project 
technical management role to lead the development effort for a given fuze program, 
through IPTs formed with members from each of the specialized home groups as 
appropriate.  
Recommend establishing a team of manufacturing engineers, as another home 
group, to introduce a new core competency within the ARDEC Fuze Division. As a 
member of a fuze development IPT, the manufacturing engineer would be responsible to 
ensure that manufacturing fabrication and assembly processes are considered at all phases 
throughout the fuze design process. Since government agencies such as ARDEC are  
not generally involved in manufacturing other than observing and managing production 
at various contractor facilities, establishing and maintaining a credible team of 
manufacturing engineers will be a challenge for an organization such at the Fuze 
Division. Deliberate measures including formal education, frequent active participation in 
government—Industry partnerships and manufacturing trade organizations will be 
necessary to ensure the successful development of this key area of expertise. In the case 
of ARDEC, however, the Fuze Development Center currently includes some key 
manufacturing capabilities, which will provide an excellent resource to coordinate with 
and develop the manufacturing engineering group. 
Recommend the formation of a design review board, which would comprise all of 
the branch chiefs. The design review board would review each fuze design on a regular 
basis, to ensure all appropriate engineering disciplines are integrated into the design 
process and also serve as a preliminary review to prepare the team for required formal 
reviews by safety boards.  
The upper management (division and branch chiefs) would be expected to 
interface with Project Management Offices on a regular basis to assist in the development 
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of fuze requirements documentation. In addition to ensuring that expected fuze 
performance requirements are defined appropriately, the Fuze Division management 
would promote the value of early inclusion of manufacturing engineering into all fuze 
design programs. Whenever possible, manufacturing processes should be included along 
with mission-related performance characteristics, to be considered in trade studies at all 
milestone design review points. This is an example of working within the limits of the 
established policy to inject manufacturing design considerations earlier into the 
development process. 
D. AREAS TO CONDUCT FURTHER RESEARCH 
It would be of interest to determine the level of excellence from which a 
government agency such as ARDEC could expect from a manufacturing engineering 
group with limited direct exposure to actual manufacturing and production of fuzes.  
Introduce a “marketing” or “business development” type of role into the Fuze 
Division. It is evident that among the private sector, the more successful firms have 
included the customer into the early design phases, either through direct involvement or 
at least by including marketing type personnel who presumably have insight into the 
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